Iran and Saudi Arabia pursue cautious rapprochement – ​​DW – November 10, 2024

Iran and Saudi Arabia want to continue their cautious rapprochement. After a China-brokered agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, the former rivals want to deepen their relations.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's visit to the Saudi capital Riyadh in early October suggests that relations are developing. He also met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.

The tensions go back almost half a century

The rapprochement is a new approach for the two countries, whose relations have been particularly difficult since the Iranian revolution in 1979.

The tensions had their origins in a fundamentally different understanding of the political role of religion. After 1979, Iran's approach to Islam was from the perspective of social revolution. For a long time she positioned herself in the region as a leader of Shiite Muslims with rebellious tendencies.

The Sunni Saudi royal family, for its part, relies primarily on the role of religion to maintain its power. She bases her claim to leadership in the region on Islam and her role as guardian of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.

The different positions became particularly clear during the Arab Spring protests that began in 2010 and spread across the region. Saudi Arabia feared that Iran would shape and exploit the protest movements.

Yemen remains a source of conflict

Despite all the rapprochement rhetoric, the two countries remain indirectly at odds with each other in Yemen, where the radical Shiite Houthi militia tried to overthrow the government of Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and took control of large parts of the country.

While Iran supported the Houthis, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of predominantly Sunni states, also backed by the West, particularly the US, to fight them. One of the coalition's motives was to resist Iranian influence.

From the Saudi perspective, a rapprochement makes sense

Nevertheless, Sebastian Sons from the Bonn think tank CARPO believes that the current rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has several advantages from his perspective.

He told DW that after Iran's attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, Riyadh realized it could not fully rely on the US and needed to resolve issues with its Iranian neighbor. He added that in Riyadh, regional stability is seen as a prerequisite for a successful economy due to its one-sided dependence on oil.

“Riyadh also wants to finally end the conflict in Yemen and in particular the Houthis’ shelling of Saudi territory,” Sons said. “In this respect, there is hope that Iran can influence the militia.”

However, Hamidreza Azizi from the Science and Politics Foundation (SWP) in Berlin said it remains to be seen what influence Iran has on the Houthis. He told DW that it was unlikely that Iran would be able to dictate the Houthis' every move. However, he said that both Iran and the Houthis would look out for each other's interests and that this could contribute to a lasting ceasefire in Yemen.

Iran pursues its own interests

Azizi added that Iran was pursuing specific interests by moving closer to Saudi Arabia.

“Years of sanctions and economic mismanagement, corruption” have hit Iran hard, he said. “The regime was concerned about increasing economic challenges, which would likely lead to even more violent waves of protests,” adding that Iranians doubted the regime’s ability to govern effectively.

Since Iran has failed to reach an agreement with the West on the nuclear deal and “lift the economic sanctions,” he said, the country is “looking for other ways to compensate for this, for example by trying to join multilateral organizations like BRICS and the US.” Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but also to improve relations with neighbors such as Saudi Arabia.”

Iran is also concerned about its security interests, explained Azizi. Even before the China-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, “there are increasing signs that normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel could be imminent.” […] Therefore, Iran was very afraid of the possibility of an anti-Iran coalition between Arab states and Israel, and the best way to prevent the formation of such a coalition, in their opinion, was to turn to the Arab states themselves for “détente as a deterrent.”

Currently, Saudi Arabia's normalization efforts with Israel are no longer relevant before October 7, 2023, Azizi said, pointing out that Riyadh has advocated a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians, which is not currently an option for Israel.

However, he insisted that Saudi Arabia had no intention of turning against Israel or giving the impression that it was turning away from the West by moving closer to Iran. Saudi Arabia wants strategic autonomy, he said.

Saudi Arabia wants to act as a mediator

For Sons, Saudi Arabia wants to be seen as a bridge builder and mediator with all stakeholders.

“Qatar serves a similar function,” he explained. “Saudi Arabia has traditionally been more reserved, but now appears to be positioning itself as a player that keeps the channels of communication with Tehran open.”

“Messages from the Americans to the Iranians have already been transmitted through the Saudis. This will be an important part of Saudi regional policy and diplomacy in the future,” Sons said.

Azizi takes a similar view. He believes that improved Iran-Saudi relations could contribute to the region's long-term stability and that Tehran understands that rapprochement is in the interests of all parties.

This article was translated from German.