With Hamas and Hezbollah weakened, Iran now has every reason to go nuclear

Recent conflicts in the Middle East have sparked open debate among Iran's political elite over whether the country should weaponize its extensive nuclear program. From the perspective of the Iranian leadership, the reasons for this appear more convincing than ever.

Above all, Iran must restore the balance of deterrence with its long-time enemies Israel and the United States. To deter its opponents from attack or regime change, Tehran has traditionally relied on a three-pronged approach focused on missiles, militias and a nuclear program.

Recent conflicts in the Middle East have sparked open debate among Iran's political elite over whether the country should weaponize its extensive nuclear program. From the perspective of the Iranian leadership, the reasons for this appear more convincing than ever.

Above all, Iran must restore the balance of deterrence with its long-time enemies Israel and the United States. To deter its opponents from attack or regime change, Tehran has traditionally relied on a three-pronged approach focused on missiles, militias and a nuclear program.

To compensate for its weak air force, Iran invested heavily in its missile program, making its arsenal one of the most advanced in the region. Iran also anchors its asymmetric warfare strategy through the so-called “forward defense policy,” which uses militarized non-state actors to encircle Israel and the U.S. regional military presence and mobilize those forces to attack if necessary. Iran has nurtured its ties with groups hostile to the United States and Israel by building the so-called Axis of Resistance and supplying them with weapons – including sophisticated missiles and drones – as well as training and financial support.

However, Iran's missile capabilities and the Axis of Resistance have suffered a setback in recent months. The Israeli strike against Iran's most trusted partner, Hezbollah in Lebanon, has dealt a major blow to its arsenal, fighters and command and control structure. Iran was humiliated by Israel's ability to assassinate Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during his stay in Tehran this summer. Following the assassination of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar this month, Israel appears determined to further raise the stakes in establishing a new regional order.

Although Hamas and Hezbollah will continue to undermine Israel's security, these groups' ability to mobilize in Iran's defense while fighting for their own survival appears to be severely limited. Meanwhile, the United States has redoubled its efforts to protect Israel, bringing new missile defense systems into the country along with American troops to operate them to deter future attacks from Iran and its allies.

Perhaps Iran's greatest Achilles heel is its self-restraint. Over the past year, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly backed away from direct war with Israel and the United States. He has also shied away from triggering a major attack by the Axis of Resistance front. Israel interpreted this reluctance as weakness and exploited it.

This shift in regional deterrence has strengthened the argument for a nuclear umbrella in Tehran. Iran has already reached the status of a nuclear threshold and is therefore at the turning point in its arms buildup. Iran can develop enough material for a nuclear bomb in just over a week. Some experts believe the country could build a nuclear warhead to deliver these bombs within months. Just as India and Pakistan reached a relatively cold peace, Tehran could seek to curb Israeli behavior by realigning the nuclear playing field.

Another argument for why Iran might rush to the bomb is that the country has already paid the high cost of becoming a nuclear weapons state without reaping the bomb's supposed benefits.

Since the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal, which Iran was in full compliance with at the time, the United States has imposed its broadest sanctions yet against Iran. The West's relations with Tehran continued to collapse due to Iran's abysmal human rights record, its regional posture and Russia's military support during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Given the anti-Iranian sentiment in Western capitals, the Iranian leadership would be right to conclude that a comprehensive easing of US sanctions like in 2015 is not in sight. If Iran is already being treated by the West as a nuclear pariah state, why not secure the supposed security benefits of a nuclear transition?

Finally, broader geopolitical conditions today mean that the costs associated with transforming Iran into a nuclear state are lower than they were a decade ago. Tensions between world powers make it increasingly unlikely that Russia and possibly China will stand in Iran's way. Tehran can also capitalize on the Ukraine war by pushing at the UN Security Council to swap its military equipment – which Moscow desperately needs – for Russian nuclear know-how, technology and defense. The United States already fears this could happen.

Against this backdrop, proponents of nuclear armament in Iran likely face two possibilities: either Iran's nuclear facilities will ultimately be destroyed first by Israel and the United States, and then Tehran will stumble toward nuclear weapons over a prolonged period of time with depleted resources, or Iran will begins with Israel now having advanced nuclear capabilities and bogged down in Gaza and Lebanon. Iranian strategists could choose the latter option when faced with a weakened Axis of Resistance, formidable Israeli-American military power, and an Israel poised to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Despite the high likelihood that the country will be bombed by Israel and the United States during this process, the Iranian leadership may conclude that it can bear the brunt of the military action and emerge stronger.

Given the losses that Iran has suffered in its deterrence capabilities, there is an acute danger that Iran will resort to bombs. Western governments should act now to shape Iran's internal debate to prevent this outcome. A nuclear Iran can operate with greater impunity at home and abroad. It will almost certainly trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This outcome would make a region near Europe even more dangerous, not only because of the increased risk of violent conflict between states, but also because of the risk of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Western governments must warn Iran's leaders that if they decide to weaponize the country's nuclear program, it will backfire. The transition to a nuclear state is likely to provide Iran's leadership with greater guarantees against large-scale military interventions and externally imposed regime changes. But it will expose Iran to a vicious cycle of military strikes, cyberattacks and assassinations. Future Iranian nuclear weapons will not deter Israel from attacking Iran – just as Tehran did not deter Tehran from taking the unprecedented step this year of bombarding Israel, itself a nuclear power, with missiles.

Last year, Europe and the United States did not seriously seek a political exit from Tehran. The United States is caught in a cycle of escalation – by both Israeli and Iranian behavior – and appears poised to play only one military card. Without a political agenda, Iran's bomb push becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. History shows that the more attacks the United States and Israel carry out in Iran, the closer Iran gets to the bomb.

The cases in which Washington and Europe diverted Iranian calculations away from arming required serious diplomacy. The new Iranian government is made up of technocrats who have long supported negotiations with Europe and the United States and have implemented the agreements reached. Iran's new reform-minded President Masoud Pezeshkian has increased his government's openness to diplomacy with the West – and that intention must now be put to the test.

This diplomatic endeavor should involve a coalition of willing Western governments with Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Iraq, which have significant influence over Iran, Israel and the United States, among others. A new path of diplomacy with Iran within a coalition of regional actors is the best door opener for the West to prevent the Iran-Israel war from spiraling out of control and to provide greater scope for reducing tensions on other issues to accomplish.

While there is currently significant distrust between Iran and the West, both sides must engage in transactional, hard-nosed diplomacy to effect a course correction. Otherwise, the current path leads to the worst of all worlds.